--- title: "EASA Hazard Identification and Risk Management · Avioverse" description: "What 145.A.200, CAMO.A.200 and ORO.GEN.200 ask for on hazards and safety risk, with a hazard log (risk register) template and six worked entries." url: "https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-hazard-identification-safety-risk-management" --- # Hazard Identification and Safety Risk Management under EASA, with a Worked Risk Register What 145.A.200, CAMO.A.200 and ORO.GEN.200 ask for on hazards and safety risk, with a hazard log (risk register) template and six worked entries. [Dionysis Kefalas](https://avioverse.aero/articles/author/dennis-kefalas) 25 Sep 2026 17 min read For Part-145, CAMO and Air Ops staff Part 2 of 2 in Safety Management Systems Show parts Hide parts 1. 1 [EASA Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs)](https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-safety-performance-indicators-monitoring) 2. 2 EASA Hazard Identification and Risk Management Quotes checked on 25 Sep 2026 against 4 sources. Show sources Hide sources - EASA Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness (Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014) — 2 Sep 2025 revision - EASA Easy Access Rules for Air Operations (Regulation (EU) No 965/2012) — 27 Mar 2026 revision - EASA Easy Access Rules for Aircrew (Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011) — 25 Nov 2025 revision - EASA Easy Access Rules for Occurrence Reporting (Regulation (EU) No 376/2014) — 27 Sep 2023 revision On this page ## Report 26-114: the cowls were open Internal report 26-114, ExampleMRO line station: "Fan cowls on engine 2 of XX-EXA found unlatched at the walk-round. Opening them was on the handover sheet. Closing them was not." Nobody was hurt. The aircraft never left the stand. The report is not the hazard. The hazard is the condition behind it: a task split across a shift change, with opened panels recorded only on an unsigned sheet. Finding conditions like that, judging how bad they could get, changing something and checking that the change works: that is hazard identification and safety risk management. Under EASA it is point (a)(3) of the management system in 145.A.200 (maintenance organisations), CAMO.A.200 (CAMOs) and ORO.GEN.200 (air operators). The AMC adds a formal reporting scheme for hazards, a three-step risk process (analysis, assessment of tolerability, control to an acceptable level) and specified management levels who decide tolerability. None of these texts prescribes a bow-tie or a risk matrix. ## Key facts - 145.A.200(a)(3), CAMO.A.200(a)(3) and ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) require hazard identification, evaluation and risk management, "including taking actions to mitigate" and to "verify their effectiveness". - Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 defines a hazard as "a situation or an object with the potential to cause death or injury to a person, damage to equipment or a structure, loss of material, or a reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function". - The AMC's risk process is analysis, assessment "(in terms of tolerability)" and control "(in terms of mitigation) of risks to an acceptable level". - The levels of management who decide tolerability "should be specified". The AMC names no post. - A risk register is guidance: GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) says results "may be recorded" in one. - No rule, AMC or GM quoted here names a bow-tie or a risk matrix. ## What the rules require [145.A.200 (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200) Management system > (a) The organisation shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: > > (1) clearly defined accountability and lines of responsibility throughout the organisation, including a direct safety accountability of the accountable manager; > > \[…] > > (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the organisation, their evaluation and the management of the associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risks and verify their effectiveness; Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. [CAMO.A.200 (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-camo/section-a-organisation-requirements/camo-a-200) Management system > (a) The organisation shall establish, implement, and maintain a management system that includes: > > \[…] > > (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the organisation, their evaluation and the management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risks and verify their effectiveness; Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. [ORO.GEN.200 (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200) Management system > (a) The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes: > > \[…] > > (3) the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the operator, their evaluation and the management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risk and verify their effectiveness; Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Easy Access Rules for Air Operations, 27 Mar 2026 revision. Three approvals, one duty. The full texts are on the [145.A.200](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200), [CAMO.A.200](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-camo/section-a-organisation-requirements/camo-a-200) and [ORO.GEN.200](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200) rule pages. ## What counts as a hazard The management-system rules do not define the word. The GM definitions for Part-145 and Part-CAMO do: a hazard "is a condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident" ([GM1 to Annex II (Part-145) Definitions](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/general/gm1-to-annex-ii-part-145-definitions)). The occurrence reporting regulation's longer definition makes a good test for a register entry. [Article 2 (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/occurrence-reporting/regulation-eu-no-376-2014/cover-regulation/article-2) Definitions > For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply: > > \[…] > > (10) ‘hazard’ means a situation or an object with the potential to cause death or injury to a person, damage to equipment or a structure, loss of material, or a reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function; Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Easy Access Rules for Occurrence Reporting, 27 Sep 2023 revision. A condition, situation or object: not an outcome, and not a person. Most weak entries fail that test ([Article 2 in full](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/occurrence-reporting/regulation-eu-no-376-2014/cover-regulation/article-2)). | Weak entry | Why it fails | Hazard statement you can act on | | -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | "Human error" or "engineer forgot the cowls" | Names a person, or nothing you can change | "Task split across a shift change, with opened panels recorded only on an unsigned handover sheet" | | "Cowl loss in flight" | That is the consequence | Put it in the incident sequence | | "Poor subcontractor communication" | Too broad to mitigate | "New borescope subcontractor inspects to its own copy of the engine manual, with no revision check at work-order acceptance" | ## What the AMC adds: a reporting scheme and a three-step risk process [AMC1 145.A.200(a)(3) (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200#amc1-145-a-200-a-3) Safety management key processes > (a) Hazard identification processes > > (1) A reporting scheme should be the formal means of collecting, recording, analysing, acting on, and generating feedback about hazards, events and the associated risks that may affect safety. > > (2) The hazards identification should include in particular: > > (i) hazards that may be linked to human factors issues that affect human performance; and > > (ii) hazards that may stem from the organisational set-up or the existence of complex operational and maintenance arrangements (such as when multiple organisations are contracted, or when multiple levels of contracting/subcontracting are included). > > (b) Risk management processes > > (1) A formal safety risk management process should be developed and maintained that ensures reactive, proactive and predictive approach composed by: > > (i) analysis (e.g. in terms of the probability and severity of the consequences of hazards and occurrences); > > (ii) assessment (in terms of tolerability); > > (iii) control (in terms of mitigation) of risks to an acceptable level. > > Note: The severity of the consequence should be evaluated to the best knowledge and engineering judgement of the organisation, and this evaluation may require collecting information from the competent authority, incident/accident investigation reports, the design approval holder, the declarant of a declaration of design compliance, etc. > > (2) The levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks, in accordance with (b)(1)(ii), should be specified. Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. [AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#amc1-oro-gen-200-a-3) Complex operators: safety risk management > (a) Hazard identification processes > > (1) Reactive and proactive schemes for hazard identification should be the formal means of collecting, recording, analysing, acting on and generating feedback about hazards and the associated risks that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator. > > (2) All reporting systems, including confidential reporting schemes, should include an effective feedback process. > > (b) Risk assessment and mitigation processes > > (1) A formal risk management process should be developed and maintained that ensures analysis (in terms of likelihood and severity of occurrence), assessment (in terms of tolerability) and control (in terms of mitigation) of risks to an acceptable level. > > (2) The levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks, in accordance with (b)(1), should be specified. Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Easy Access Rules for Air Operations, 27 Mar 2026 revision. The Air Ops (a)(1) above is the version applicable until 31 December 2027, in force on 25 September 2026. Its replacement from 1 January 2028 adds that these schemes should include the flight data monitoring programme where one is required. The Part-CAMO AMC follows the Part-145 structure. Where the wording differs: | | Part-145 AMC | Part-CAMO AMC | Air Ops AMC (complex operators) | | ------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | | How hazards are collected | "A reporting scheme" | "A reporting scheme for both reactive event and proactive hazards" | "Reactive and proactive schemes for hazard identification" | | Analysis | "probability and severity of the consequences of hazards and occurrences" | "probability and severity of the consequences of hazards and occurrences" | "likelihood and severity of occurrence" | The severity note is the line people skip: before scoring severity, look at what the competent authority, investigation reports and the design approval holder already know. The AMCs are on their rule pages: [AMC1 145.A.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200#amc1-145-a-200-a-3), [AMC1 CAMO.A.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-camo/section-a-organisation-requirements/camo-a-200#amc1-camo-a-200-a-3) and [AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#amc1-oro-gen-200-a-3). ## Where hazards come from: reactive, proactive and predictive Of the three AMCs, only the Part-145 one uses all three words, and none defines them. In common use, reactive learns from what already happened, proactive looks for hazards before an event, and predictive watches data for a hazard starting to show. The reactive stream has a rule behind it. Under [145.A.202](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-202), internal reports go straight into safety risk management: [145.A.202 (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-202) Internal safety reporting scheme > (b) The scheme shall also enable the collection and evaluation of those errors, near misses and hazards reported internally that do not fall under point (a). > > (c) Through that scheme, the organisation shall: > > (1) identify the causes of, and contributing factors to, the errors, near misses and hazards reported, and address them as part of its safety risk management process in accordance with point 145.A.200(a)(3); Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. Report 26-114 is exactly this: an internal hazard report that never became a reportable occurrence, and still enters the risk process. [CAMO.A.202](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-camo/section-a-organisation-requirements/camo-a-202) sets up the same scheme for a CAMO. Occurrence analysis under Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 is quoted in [Occurrence Analysis and Follow-up in the SMS](https://avioverse.aero/guides/occurrence-analysis-follow-up-sms). Sources behind the worked entries below: | Source | Usual label | Entry it produced | | ------------------------------------------------ | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | | Internal report of an error, near miss or hazard | Reactive | H-01: the night-shift report on XX-EXA | | Near-miss report from a flight crew | Reactive | H-06: a late load-sheet change caught before take-off | | Change: a new subcontractor | Proactive | H-02: ExampleMRO's new borescope provider | | Internal audit | Proactive | H-03: ExampleCAMO's phase-in records audit | | Hazard report from a planner | Proactive | H-04: AMP revision loading delay | | Trend in the monthly flight data review | Predictive | H-05: unstabilised approaches at one aerodrome | For contracted work, the GM sets out what to assess: [GM1 145.A.200(a)(3) (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200#gm1-145-a-200-a-3) Safety risk management: interfaces between organisations > (b) Hazard identification and risk assessment start with the identification of all the parties involved in the arrangement, including independent experts and non-approved organisations. This identification process extends to cover the overall control structure, and assesses in particular the following elements across all subcontract levels and all parties within such arrangements: > > (1) coordination and interfaces between the different parties; > > (2) applicable procedures; > > (3) communication between all the parties involved, including reporting and feedback channels; > > (4) task allocation, responsibilities and authorities; and > > (5) the qualifications and competency of key personnel with reference to point 145.A.30. Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. Those five elements make a checklist for any new contract; H-02 came from item (2). The same five elements appear in [GM1 CAMO.A.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-camo/section-a-organisation-requirements/camo-a-200#gm1-camo-a-200-a-3) and [GM4 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#gm4-oro-gen-200-a-3); the Part-145 GM is on the [145.A.200 page](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200#gm1-145-a-200-a-3). ## The method is yours: no bow-tie or matrix in the rules Nothing in 145.A.200, CAMO.A.200, ORO.GEN.200 or the AMC and GM quoted here names a bow-tie, a risk matrix or a scoring scale; the tool is the organisation's choice. For non-complex air operators, [AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(1);(2);(3);(5)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#amc1-oro-gen-200-a-1) says so outright: "Safety risk management may be performed using hazard checklists or similar risk management tools or processes, which are integrated into the activities of the operator." EASA's user guides for the Part-145 and Part-CAMO approvals it issues mention methods by name ("ICAO safety risk matrix, ARMS, BOW-TIE, etc."), but a user guide is not rule text. Two tools are common. A bow-tie maps threats, barriers and consequences around one top event; [Bow-tie risk assessment in aviation](https://avioverse.aero/articles/bow-tie-risk-assessment-aviation-example) builds one for a maintenance hazard. A matrix turns probability and severity into a band; [the aviation risk matrix](https://avioverse.aero/articles/aviation-risk-matrix-likelihood-severity) covers the definitions. The public [SMS hazard library](https://avioverse.aero/risks) groups bow-tie starting points by SMS domain. ## Who decides that a risk is acceptable Both quoted AMCs end their risk paragraph the same way: the levels of management who decide on tolerability "should be specified". Neither names a post or committee. 145.A.200(a)(1) gives the accountable manager "a direct safety accountability", and a common arrangement routes the highest band to that post. The allocation is yours to write. This is ExampleMRO's allocation, not EASA's: | Band | Who decides | What the decision means | | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Acceptable | Manager of the area | Proceed; review at the next scheduled review | | Tolerable | Safety manager with the nominated person for the area | Proceed only with the added mitigation, each action with an owner and a date | | Intolerable | Accountable manager | Stop or change the activity now | Record the decision on the row, with a name and a date. A register of scores without decisions shows analysis without assessment. ## A hazard log and risk register template you can use Many organisations call this list a hazard log; the Air Ops guidance calls it a risk register. It is the same working list: each hazard, its assessment, its mitigation and who owns it. Only the Air Ops guidance quoted here gives an example register. [GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#gm3-oro-gen-200-a-3) Safety risk assessment: risk register > The results of the assessment of the potential adverse consequences or outcome of each hazard may be recorded by the operator in a risk register, an example of which is provided below. Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Easy Access Rules for Air Operations, 27 Mar 2026 revision. The example is a blank table ([GM3 on the ORO.GEN.200 page](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/air-ops/part-oro/subpart-gen/oro-gen-200#gm3-oro-gen-200-a-3)); approved training organisations get the same one in [GM4 ORA.GEN.200(a)(3)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/aircrew/part-ora/subpart-gen/ora-gen-200#gm4-ora-gen-200-a-3). The Part-145 and Part-CAMO AMC and GM have no register example, so a maintenance organisation or CAMO can borrow this one: | Heading in the GM3 example | What goes in it | Common mistake | | ----------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | | Hazard: No. and Description | A permanent reference; the situation or object | Writing the outcome or a person | | Incident Sequence Description | How the hazard becomes harm, step by step | Jumping straight to the worst case | | Existing Controls | Controls that exist and work today | Listing planned controls | | Outcome (Pre-Mitigation): Severity, Likelihood, Risk | The score with existing controls only | Scoring the worst imaginable outcome, not the worst credible one | | Additional Mitigation required | Changes specific enough to audit | "Raise awareness" | | Outcome (Post-Mitigation): Severity, Likelihood, Risk | The forecast if the new controls work | Treating the forecast as achieved | | Actions and Owners | A named person and a date per action | A department instead of a person | | Monitoring and Review Requirements | Indicator, data source, review date | "Monitor" with nothing to measure | Worth adding: the source (report, finding or change), the date identified, and the tolerability decision. ## Six worked entries Scores use probability 1 (extremely improbable) to 5 (frequent) and severity A (catastrophic) to E (negligible), banded with the ICAO default. They are the fictional organisations' judgements, not reference values. | No. · organisation | Hazard → incident sequence | Existing controls | Additional mitigation | Before → after | Owner · monitoring | | ---------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | H-01 · ExampleMRO line | Task split across a shift change, opened panels only on an unsigned handover sheet → fan cowls left unlatched → cowl lost in flight | Handover sheet; crew walk-round | Opened panels raised as open items on the task card; fan cowl closure an independent inspection; handover at the aircraft | 3B tolerable → 2B tolerable | Line maintenance manager, by 30 November 2026 · open items found at independent inspection per 100 split tasks | | H-02 · ExampleMRO base | New borescope subcontractor works from its own copy of the engine manual → superseded limits applied → in-flight shutdown | Contract requires current data; supplier audit | Controlled manual extract issued with each work order; reports must quote that revision | 3C tolerable → 2C tolerable | Base maintenance manager · reports rejected for revision mismatch, quarterly | | H-03 · ExampleCAMO | AD status accepted from the previous CAMO's list at phase-in → recurring AD overflown | Records review checklist | AD status rebuilt from source records; entry into service held until discrepancies close | 4C tolerable → 2C tolerable | Technical records lead · discrepancies found per phase-in | | H-04 · ExampleCAMO | AMP revision loaded into planning weeks after issue → forecast on superseded intervals → task overrun, aircraft grounded | Planner check of the monthly forecast | Loading made a closure step of every AMP revision | 3D tolerable → 2D acceptable | Head of planning · days from revision issue to load | | H-05 · ExampleAir | Unstabilised visual approaches continued at one outstation → long or fast landing → runway excursion | Stabilised-approach criteria and go-around policy | Interim higher stabilisation gate from the day of the decision; route briefing and simulator scenario | 4B intolerable → 3B tolerable | Accountable manager (interim gate); head of flight operations (actions) · unstabilised approaches per 1,000 at that aerodrome | | H-06 · ExampleAir | Late load-sheet changes passed by radio at an outstation, no read-back → wrong take-off mass entered → tail strike | Load-sheet procedure; crew cross-check | Mandatory read-back and a written copy for any change after the final load sheet | 3C tolerable → 2C tolerable | Ground operations manager, by 31 December 2026 · late changes without a written copy, from the handling audit | In every entry the mitigation lowers likelihood; severity does not move. Most rows stay tolerable, so most need a decision from the level your procedure names. The intolerable row, H-05, does not wait for a review meeting. ## From mitigation to monitoring The clause a register most easily leaves undone is "verify their effectiveness". The Part-145 AMC places that check in safety performance monitoring and continuous improvement: [AMC1 145.A.200(a)(3) (full rule text)](https://avioverse.aero/regulations/easa/continuing-airworthiness/part-145/section-a-technical-and-organisation-requirements/145-a-200#amc1-145-a-200-a-3) Safety management key processes > (d) Safety performance monitoring and measurement > > \[…] > > (2) These processes may include, as appropriate to the size, nature and complexity of the organisation: > > \[…] > > (iii) safety audits that focus on the integrity of the organisation’s management system, and on periodically assessing the status of safety risk controls; > > \[…] > > (f) Continuous improvement > > \[…] > > (5) evaluation of safety performance indicators and reviews of all the available safety performance information; and Quoted word for word from Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, Easy Access Rules for Continuing Airworthiness, 2 Sep 2025 revision. Every row whose post-mitigation score depends on a new control gets one indicator that would move if the control failed: the last column above. When it moves the wrong way, the row goes back to assessment; either the forecast was wrong or the control is not in place. Put the same controls into the audit programme so someone checks them on purpose. Choosing indicators like these, and reviewing them, is covered in part 1 of this series, [EASA Safety Performance Indicators: What the Rules Say](https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-safety-performance-indicators-monitoring). Setting targets and alert levels has its own [worked example](https://avioverse.aero/articles/spi-targets-alert-levels-worked-example). ## Keeping the register in Avioverse In Avioverse the register lives in **Risks**: **My assessments**; the **Hazard register**, which mirrors them with one row per hazard; the workspace's own **Barriers** list; a read-only **Hazard library** to start from; and the workspace **Matrix**. From **New assessment**, choose **Create manually** or **Draft with Metis**. One assessment can hold several bow-ties (**Add bow-tie**), one per top event. Each shows a **Current risk**, which credits only controls that are in place, and a **Residual risk forecast**, which adds the planned ones. That is the GM3 pre- and post-mitigation split, with the second figure labelled as a forecast. Scores come from the workspace risk matrix: a fixed 5×5 with ICAO default bands. Workspace owners and admins can re-band cells and change colours, or use **Reset to ICAO default**. The default is a preset, not an authority-approved matrix, and editing it later changes the band shown on saved assessments. Saving keeps a **Draft**. **Finalise** records who finalised it and when, with an optional next-review date. It is not a second person's approval and not organisational risk acceptance; that stays with the level your procedure names. **Create task** turns a recommendation into a task. A finished task does not lower the risk: the assessment asks whether the barrier is in place (**In place** or **Not yet — reopen task**), then offers **Adopt residual risk** once every planned barrier on a bow-tie is in place. In place means implemented; it does not say the barrier works. That judgement, the "verify their effectiveness" part of the rule, is recorded separately, in the **Barriers** tab: once a barrier is in place in a finalised assessment, **Confirm effectiveness** records your answer (**Confirm effective** or **Not effective**) with who and when, an optional evidence note and an optional date to review it again. An audit finding's risk decision is **Create new**, **Link existing** or **No risk assessment** with a written rationale; the finding cannot close without a finalised linked assessment or that rationale. **Draft with Metis** drafts bow-ties and saves a draft when you ask. It cannot finalise. The PDF export includes the change history. Avioverse is your working register, not your organisation's SMS record. Educational content, not regulatory compliance advice. Verify against the current regulation text before relying on it. ## In this series ## Frequently asked questions ### Does EASA require a bow-tie or a risk matrix? No. 145.A.200(a)(3), CAMO.A.200(a)(3) and ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) require hazard identification, evaluation and risk management, and the AMC describes analysis, assessment of tolerability and control. None of those texts names a bow-tie or a risk matrix, so the method is the organisation's choice. ### Who accepts a safety risk under EASA rules? The AMC says the levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks should be specified. It does not name a post, so your own procedures say who decides for each band of your matrix. ### What is the difference between reactive, proactive and predictive hazard identification? The Part-145 AMC asks for a reactive, proactive and predictive approach; the Part-CAMO and Air Ops AMC name only reactive and proactive. The texts do not define the terms. In common use, reactive works from events that happened, proactive looks for hazards before an event, and predictive watches data for emerging trends. ### Is a risk register mandatory under EASA? The format is not. GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) says the results may be recorded in a risk register and gives an example layout. The AMC does expect a formal means of collecting, recording, analysing and acting on hazards, so you need a record in some form. ### What is a hazard under EASA rules? For the Part-145 and Part-CAMO AMC and GM, a hazard is a condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident. Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 defines it as a situation or an object with the potential to cause death or injury to a person, damage to equipment or a structure, loss of material, or a reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function. ### Do hazards at subcontractors count? Yes. The Part-145 and Part-CAMO AMC point hazard identification at arrangements where several organisations are contracted, and the interface GM says hazard identification starts with identifying all the parties involved, including independent experts and non-approved organisations. ## Related - [EASA Safety Performance Indicators: What the Rules Say Guide · 17 min](https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-safety-performance-indicators-monitoring) - [Bow-Tie Risk Assessment in Aviation: A Worked Example Article · 13 min](https://avioverse.aero/articles/bow-tie-risk-assessment-aviation-example) - [Aviation Risk Matrix: Likelihood, Severity and EASA Article · 12 min](https://avioverse.aero/articles/aviation-risk-matrix-likelihood-severity) - [Occurrence Analysis and Follow-up in the SMS Guide · 5 min](https://avioverse.aero/guides/occurrence-analysis-follow-up-sms) - [CAMO and CAO Continuing Airworthiness Bodies Guide · 7 min](https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-camo-continuing-airworthiness-management-organisation) - [Part-ORO Operations Manual and Management System Guide · 5 min](https://avioverse.aero/guides/easa-operations-manual-management-system) Written by Dionysis Kefalas. Retired Hellenic Air Force Captain and founder of Avioverse. [About the author](https://avioverse.aero/articles/author/dennis-kefalas) [Or request early access →](https://avioverse.aero/register?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fapp.avioverse.aero%2Frisks) Share [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Favioverse.aero%2Fguides%2Feasa-hazard-identification-safety-risk-management)[X](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https%3A%2F%2Favioverse.aero%2Fguides%2Feasa-hazard-identification-safety-risk-management\&text=EASA%20Hazard%20Identification%20and%20Risk%20Management)